Both Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein are well known for having
produced philosophical-
Kierkegaard's 'authorship' (as he himself called it) includes
a pseudonymous symposium in which various ideas and points of
view are presented. It also includes the 'devotional addresses'
and 'edifying discourses,' which are less often read; while they
are not a remarkable form of writing in themselves (however
remarkable they may be in content), when they are understood in
connection with the pseudonymous works which they 'accompanied' -
as part of the dialectic - they become part of a remarkable
pattern. A third part of Kierkegaard's public writings is the
'attack' of his last months, which must also be seen in
connection with the total opus. In addition to his
writings, he saw his life as an important part of his
communication (as has been suggested above).
The private material from his journals and papers
conveniently shows the connection between his personal experience
and the public works. As such it provides an added perspective
on his work.
The form of Wittgenstein's writings is extraordinary for at
least two reasons. The first is that there seem to be two
'authorships.' This idea is supported by Wittgenstein's own
statements; in the later works he repeatedly refers to 'the
author of the Tractatus' as though he were another
person.1 The second remarkable
feature of Wittgenstein's production is that both parts of it are
equally unusual experiments in communication. The
Tractatus is notable for the logical rigor of its
presentation. A unique point of view is single-
The private notes take on an added significance in
Wittgenstein's case; since only the Tractatus was
published by him (although the Investigations, and some
other collections of notes, had clearly been edited with a view
to publication) they are not merely an interesting source for an
understanding of the private development of his thought. They
are also the only guidelines for an attempt to grasp the general
outline of his thinking in several related areas.
Neither author said much directly in the public forum about
the objectives of his writing. But hints exist in various parts
of the public works, and (particularly in the case of
Kierkegaard) more than hints are available in the
Nachlaß. This chapter will attempt to clarify the
question of the authors' goals, by an investigation of the
methods which they used. In both cases the two are bound up
together.
One of the most important influences on the methods used by the
two authors is their understanding of the place and limitations
of 'philosophy.' Wittgenstein provides a succinct definition in
the Investigations: 'Philosophy is a battle against the
bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.'2 This thought
can be related to two different bodies of material. The first
connection is to the central battle which Kierkegaard fought,
against the illusion that in 'Christendom' all are by definition
'Christians.'3 Surely this is also a
battle against bewitchment by means of language! Despite the
similarity in appearance and derivation between the two words,
they are only slightly related in the concepts they express: they
have a 'family resemblance,' but they are distant cousins. A
metaphor used by Wittgenstein is helpful here. The two concepts
can be thought of as related in the same way as are the concepts
'railway train,' 'railway accident' and 'railway law.' Although
these all are complex concepts which have to do with railways,
they are thoroughly different: one indicates an object, one a
momentary event, and one a conceptual codification.4 Similarly,
'Christendom' is a geopolitical relation, and 'Christianity' a
spiritual state. [32]
The second direction in which the definition from the
Investigations can be related is to the following passages
from the Tractatus:
Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts.
It must set limits to what can be thought; and in doing
so, to what cannot be thought.
It will signify what cannot be said, by presenting
clearly what can be said.5
Thus at the very beginning, Wittgenstein's definition changes
the idea of 'philosophy.' A boundary wall is erected in the
traditional subject matter of philosophy. Important things occur
on both sides of the wall; but direct statements (sayings) can
reach only one side. What is on the other side can only be
'signified' or 'shown.'
Kierkegaard saw a similar wall. The attempt to reach the
other side of this wall is a constant temptation, as he notes:
[The] ultimate potentiation of every passion is always to
will its own downfall, and so it is also the ultimate passion
of the understanding to will the collision, although in one
way or another the collision must become its downfall. This,
then, is the ultimate paradox of thought: to want to discover
something that thought itself cannot think. This passion of
thought is fundamentally present everywhere in thought, also
in the single individual's thought.6
For both Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein, philosophy is
inevitable. But another essential feature of their thinking is
that the place of philosophy is limited. It can do some
preliminary brush-
An important kindred feature of both Kierkegaard's and
Wittgenstein's thought at this point is their interest in
limiting the scope of their discussions. That is, philosophy has
a limited place within their total universes of discourse; but
even these universes are limited in size. Kierkegaard puts this
limitation most clearly; his entire work is
related to Christianity, to the problem of 'becoming a
Christian,' with a direct or indirect polemic against the
monstrous illusion we call Christendom, or against the
illusion that in such a land as ours all are Christians of a
sort.7
In reading his works this must never be forgotten. Apparent gaps
in his analyses may relate to the fact that they are only
constructed for this particular purpose. (For instance, he
explicitly says that his definition of truth as subjective only
applies to 'the truth which relates to existence.')8 The
authorship is a polemical corrective to the problems of the age.
It may be recognized as such because it is opposed to the 'evil
of the age.' Kierkegaard's championing of 'the individual' is a
polemical result of the crowd mentality which he perceived in his
age. Any good that there may be in that mentality (from a
balanced view) is not his concern as a polemical, religious
author.9
Kierkegaard's understanding of the place of philosophy in his
task may be better understood when seen in comparison with his
description of the power and way of working of the ironist, from
The Concept of Irony: 'As the ironist does not have the
new within his power, it might be asked how he destroys the old,
and to this it must be answered: he destroys the given actuality
by the given actuality itself.'10 The biographical root
of the method of indirect communication can be found in
Kierkegaard's relation with Regine. But its philosophical
antecedent is his work on Socrates. Like Socrates, he is able to
demonstrate the inadequacies of philosophy by an ironic use of
its own categories.
This also recalls Wittgenstein's way of working: 'the work of
the philosopher consists in assembling reminders ["given" in the
world] for a particular purpose.'11 Wittgenstein's
projects are also under a limitation similar to Kierkegaard's.
The purpose of philosophy, according to him, is to eliminate
itself! Wittgenstein's usual method [34] is
to get clear
about particular 'philosophical' problems, and in so doing to
show some features of philosophy in general. So his reminders
may be various in their form. There may be
polemical-
For both Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard, one particular problem
demanding this unusual mode of thinking and communication is the
ethical dimension of life. Wittgenstein's works also include
explicit consideration of another essential feature requiring
this other kind of thinking: the way in which language, thinking,
and understanding work.
The key to this unusual kind of thinking and representation
is contained in a brief statement by Wittgenstein: 'What
can be shown, cannot be said.'12 The
logical and ethical dimensions are features which 'show
themselves' in the world; but they are not directly expressible.
Kierkegaard used the term 'paradox' to refer to human
apprehension of such phenomena.
Paul Holmer suggests a way of looking at this
inexpressibility which connects the early Wittgenstein both with
his later works and with Kierkegaard. He points out that since
certain dimensions 'cannot be said,' then the locus of certainty
about them cannot be any doctrine. Instead, the thinker must be
certain. 'Seeing is a capacity and can only be done by people,
not
sayings.'13
The theme of important material that is inaccessible to
investigation is maintained through the later period. A key
phrase used to refer to the problem is 'explanations come to an
end somewhere.'14 Nothing could be more
essential than the features which do not require or permit
explanation; it is precisely the fact that they are basic that
makes them resistant to further analysis. As they are part of
the framework of life, there are no tools available to get at
them. Another key phrase is 'the limits of language.'15 The later
philosophy is concerned, as is the earlier, to show that there
are certain games in which these limits ought to limit us, and
certain games in which they may be (rightly) [35]
transcended - but also certain games in which they are in fact
transcended, but wrongly or with infelicitous results. As
Wittgenstein remarks, the existence of a wall or other boundary
is not an unambiguous explanation of its purpose.16 This may
even depend on circumstances; jumping the tennis net is only a
correct move after one wins the game. Wittgenstein takes
metaphysical and other second-
Similarly, for Kierkegaard the attempt to philosophize sub
specie aeterni is a wrong transcendence. It is wrong because
it is forgetful of the existential situation and limitations of
human beings. 'An existential system is impossible.'17 On the
other hand, the leap of faith is permissible, to say the least.
Its permissibility is also rooted in the human existential
situation - our need for assurance.
There is a feature of Kierkegaard's and Wittgenstein's methods
which makes the task of studying them more difficult. This is
that statements about the method and uses of the
method are often intertwined. Paul Holmer observes concerning
Kierkegaard that there are two kinds of sentences in his works.
One of these types of sentence expresses in linguistic form the
immediate experience of a subject. In this kind of sentence,
Kierkegaard's poetic bent shows itself. The other kind of
sentence is one which deals with 'other sentences' or concepts.
In this kind of work Kierkegaard is at his most philosophical and
analytic.18
This distinction is easy to see in the case of The Point
of View, which consists largely of statements of the second
kind. But the 'authorship' proper (both pseudonymous and
acknowledged works) does not by any means consist only of
statements of the first kind. Rather, in it they are liberally
interlarded with philosophical and programmatic statements. It
is often difficult to separate the two kinds. Indeed, sometimes
the very same phrase seems to be both an existential or
psychological observation, and a philosophical comment. This
close connection of the two kinds of work reflects Kierkegaard's
particular genius for rooting his writing in his own unified
existence as a 'poet-
One of the best examples of this intertwining is the passage
from the Postscript in which Johannes Climacus explains
the principle of his 'authorship.' Climacus sets himself
forth as an indolent student of philosophy. But one day while
smoking a cigar in the public [36] gardens,
he has
realized what he might be able to contribute to the well-
This passage combines the indirect communication of an
important principle of Kierkegaard's thought with the picture of
Climacus, itself an indirect orientation as to how this work is
to be taken. By the superposition over the course of a work of
many such pictures and communications - a technique reminiscent
of Wittgenstein's simile of the Galtonian photograph -
Kierkegaard brings precision to his delineation of personality
and philosophical position.
If this technique is a product of Kierkegaard's particular
genius, certainly Wittgenstein shares his talent. Indeed, since
in the case of Wittgenstein there is no parallel to The Point
of View, the puzzle is even more complex. It is clear that
Wittgenstein's works combine attacks on particular philosophical
problems with his considerations of the possibility of
philosophy; but the two tasks are not divided. More often than
not, the same sentence does duty in the two endeavors. At least,
the works themselves constitute a 'showing' of the correct way to
do philosophy (while they 'say' things about various particular
problems); and this is not at all a trivial showing since the
form of the books is so radically different from that of previous
philosophical works.20
An essential point about this method is that the same
features evident in ordinary language use are used in philosophy.
Holmer raises the question whether philosophical elucidations of
grammatical distinctions might be neither sayings nor showings.
He suggests that they constitute 'pointers' instead.21 (At any
rate, they would remain indirectly communicated.) The burden of
this suggestion seems to be that philosophers call attention to
language in a way not done everyday. But pointing is a common
phenomenon in which saying and showing are intertwined. It is
even used as a method of proof: Wittgenstein was fascinated by
the report that, for some Indian mathematicians, 'Look at this!'
was a geometrical proof.22 So there is no need
to introduce philosophical 'pointing' as an absolutely special
phenomenon.
Holmer is trying to make a fine distinction between
philosophical and non-
One of the central methods used by the two authors is that of
'leading' the reader to a position. Wittgenstein remarks:
We must begin with the mistake and transform it into what is
true.
That is, we must uncover the source of the error;
otherwise hearing what is true won't help us. It cannot
penetrate when something is taking its place.
To convince someone of what is true, it is not enough to
state it; we must find the road from error to
truth.24
Kierkegaard agrees 'that if real success is to attend the effort
to bring a man to a definite position, one must first of all take
pains to find HIM where he is and begin there.'25
Kierkegaard stresses psychological reasons for this manner of
working: didactic prating is likely to make the listener ignore
the message, and in the case of the message of 'becoming a
Christian' this would be a tragedy. Wittgenstein's motivations
are slightly different: keeping a solid anchor in reality is
important to him principally for reasons of philosophical
soundness, rather than due to any belief in the essential
importance of his message.
The Point of View explains in great detail how this
idea applies to Kierkegaard's works. He was always a religious
writer; but he produced aesthetic works and philosophical works
in an attempt to appeal to various kinds of readers. The fact
that the 'Diary of the Seducer' has been published separately
from the rest of Either/Or shows how successfully that
part of the work mirrors aestheticism. The Fragments and
the Postscript 'mirror' philosophy, not so much by their
character as by the philosophical terminology and problems of
which they make use. But at the same time, the various
Edifying Discourses, written in an obviously religious
form, exist as proof that he was always a religious writer.
The application of the idea of 'leading' to Wittgenstein's
work is not so clear. One way in which it characteristically
shows itself is within the individual works, or groups of notes.
The remarks on [38] the Golden Bough
begin with
Frazer's mistaken position, and attempt to show the outline of a
better analysis of the facts he reports. The Philosophical
Investigations begins with a passage from Augustine on
language-
What each of these works reflects is Wittgenstein's penchant
for tackling one particular problem at a time, and worrying at it
until he had gotten everything he could out of it. The
individual works are not philosophies, or systems of philosophy:
he once reacted violently when someone proposed that he should
simply call the Investigations 'Philosophy.'27 They are
treatments of specific subjects.
At first glance, it might seem difficult to fit the
Tractatus into this mold. It appears to be
systematic and all-
Several considerations militate in the opposite direction.
First of all, the Tractatus was written in reaction to the
logical work of Russell and Frege. (It is interesting to note
that neither of them understood it to Wittgenstein's
satisfaction.) So it must at least start with logic if it is to
follow his own methodology. Secondly, there is the evidence of
Wittgenstein's own understanding of the scope and goal of the
work. This is different from the first impression left by the
text. The most straightforward expression of this understanding
is given in another letter which he wrote to Ficker.
It will probably be helpful for you if I write a few words
about my book: For you won't - I really believe - get too
much out of reading it. Because you won't understand it; the
content will seem quite strange to you. In reality, it isn't
strange to you, for the point of the book is ethical. I once
wanted to give a few words in the foreword which now actually
are not in it, which, however, I'll write to you now because
they might be a key for you: I wanted to write that my work
consists of two parts: of the one which is here, and of
everything which I have not written. [39]
And precisely this second part is the important one. For the
Ethical is delimited from within, as it were, by my book; and
I'm convinced that, strictly speaking, it can ONLY be
delimited in this way. In brief, I think: All of that which
many are babbling today, I have defined in my
book by remaining silent about it.29
Why would anyone write an ethical book that seems to be a
logical book, so that those who are most likely to agree with it
will not understand it? One possible explanation would be that
those most likely to agree are not the intended audience. The
audience suggested by the form of the book is logicians. If it
is precisely some mistakes in logic that are preventing the
logicians (and those influenced by them - in modern society,
potentially a huge group!) from 'seeing things aright' ethically,
and if the correct ethical view will have repercussions on their
logical ideas, then in order to help them to find out the truth
one must lead them from logic to ethics.30
Without this understanding, the curious form of the
Tractatus seems even more curious when it is compared to
the form of the notebooks which Wittgenstein kept at the time he
was composing it. These notebooks are in the style which is
familiar in the works of the later Wittgenstein, rather than in
any systematic style. They reflect his discursive struggle to
understand the issues. The material on the 'ethical' in the
final form of the book is presented in a form most similar to
that of the notebooks. This suggests that the style of the
Tractatus is purposely artificial. Not only is it an
expression of the best of the material from the notebooks (or of
the position finally reached); this expression has been cast in a
style which relates to a particular purpose.31
In the preface to the Philosophical Investigations,
Wittgenstein explains that he has been unable to develop that
work into a unified form, as he had at first wanted.32 But he
realized that the somewhat discombobulated style is appropriate
to a technique which consists in multiple methods for various
problems.33 The form of the
Tractatus is appropriate to a technique which promotes one
understanding as the solution to all problems.34
All of these features point toward an expansion of the idea
of 'finding the reader where he is.' Once one has done this,
then some technique must be devised for getting the reader to
progress. A didactic method will not be useful, since it assumes
the correctness of the speaker's position. [40]
Kierkegaard called the method which he used in a similar
situation 'indirect communication.' As he claims in The Point
of View, the whole of his work is related to the 'problem of
becoming a Christian.' But at first glance, the larger part of
his literary production has little to do with this problem.
Instead, he describes the life of the aesthete and the ethicist
from within, and apes the writings of the philosopher. The
purpose of this description is nevertheless consistent with his
project.
In a series of notes for lectures on communication,
Kierkegaard distinguishes between the appropriate methods for
communicating 'science' and 'art.' Science or specific knowledge
of content must be communicated directly; art, ability or
potential competence, on the other hand, is already within the
subject, and hence must be taught in another way. It is a
question of 'luring the ethical out of the individual,' rather
than 'beating it into him.' The indirect communicator stands in
a 'maieutic' relationship to the listener. He is not imparting
any new knowledge; instead he is bringing something out in the
other. As Kierkegaard says, 'the object of the communication
is
The 'midwife's' role in this case is very delicate. It is a
question of maintaining the distinction between 'standing by
another's help alone' and 'standing alone - by another's help.'
Clearly the second, ironic alternative is the one aimed at. The
midwife is attempting to give an advantage - but if the one
helped has any idea that he is being helped, then that may become
a disadvantage.36 So it is that the
indirect communicator must somehow manage to touch the intended
recipient of the communication without revealing himself. As
Kierkegaard says somewhere, he must pass him going in the
opposite direction and yet somehow manage to give him a push!
The expressed purpose of the Tractatus is to show that
'what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot
talk about we must pass over in silence.' In order to achieve
this purpose, problems of philosophy are discussed (said), and it
is shown 'that the reason why these problems [of philosophy] are
posed is that the logic of our language is misunderstood.' But
part of the value of the work is yet another showing: 'it shows
how little is achieved when these problems are solved.'37
There is a direct and an indirect part to the results.
Two very important explicit parts of the scheme of the
Tractatus (as well as the whole scheme of showing) have to
do with the need [41] for indirect communication. The
first concerns the status of logic. Logical form, as the form of
propositions and the world, does not exist in the world and
cannot be expressed in words. 'Logic is not a body of doctrine,
but a mirror image of the world.'38 It makes the whole
scheme of language possible. While occurrences within the world
are 'accidental,' and could be otherwise, the logical framework
is fixed. It is nonsensical to make statements about something
which cannot be otherwise: there is no point of
comparison. Thus logic cannot be discussed.
Ethical considerations are also bound up with indirect
communication. Here the indirection is double: not only are
ethical propositions not candidates for direct expression
(according to the Tractatus); but the very communication
of this fact is itself indirect. The ethical content of the
world cannot be expressed in words; like logic it is 'not part of
the world.' Just as logic cannot be 'accidental,' so values (if
they are to escape relativism) must not depend on 'what is the
case.'39 This analysis squares
with Kierkegaard's thesis 'attributable to Lessing' that
accidental truths of history cannot serve as proofs for eternal
truths of reason.40
Both the phenomena of logic and values are said to be
'transcendental.'41 This is certainly not
to say that they do not exist; but they cannot be directly
discussed. By discussing the way in which the world is
constructed and mirrored in language, Wittgenstein is indirectly
showing the importance of those things which cannot be spoken
about. The strictly correct way of doing philosophy, he says,
would be to say only what can be said. This method would
be even more indirect that the method which he actually uses.
Wittgenstein's actual method is to make statements which are
(strictly speaking from within the final result)
nonsensical.42 The listener's role
is to 'transcend' these propositions, in order to reach a vantage
point from which he can 'see the world aright.'43 This
remains an indirect mode of communication.
Thus there is a redoubled indirection in the communication of
the Tractatus. First of all, the ethical purpose is
hidden behind the logical appearance of the work. Secondly, the
logical apparatus is incapable of carrying its own weight. It
does appear to be a direct communication; but on the metaphysical
level it cannot be one. The foundations of logic, too, ought to
be indirectly communicated.
A modification of the doctrine of indirect communication is
at [42] work in Wittgenstein's later works.
He repeatedly
denies that philosophical points can be made by the advancing of
'theses.'44 Theses can only be
about facts, and so everyone would agree to them; it would be
impossible to have arguments and various positions. Philosophy
is not concerned to give new information, as do the sciences, for
example. Instead, it is concerned with 'putting everything before
us,' 'assembling reminders,' with the aim of complete clarity.
The ideal way of gaining clarity, for the later Wittgenstein, is
the method of 'perspicuity': 'arranging the factual material so
that we can easily pass from one part to another and have a clear
view of it.'
For us the conception of a perspicuous presentation is
fundamental. It indicates the form in which we write of
things, the way in which we see things.
This perspicuous presentation makes possible that
understanding which consists just in the fact that we 'see
the connections.' Hence the importance of finding
intermediate links.45
If 'a philosophical problem has the form "I don't know my way
about,"'46 then perspicuous
presentation is intended to suggest an arrangement or map of the
facts, to remove the confusions. Or, if philosophy is to be
treated like a sickness,47 then the various
methods of the philosopher, which clarify the problems, are like
various therapies.48
That this is a doctrine of indirect communication should be
clear. Direct communication proceeds by the advancing of theses.
These are appropriate to science. But philosophy cannot
communicate directly. Instead, by arranging what we already
know49 the philosopher makes
problems disappear. Of course, the satisfaction of the answer is
not communicated; every reader or listener must examine and agree
with the proposed 'solution.'
Kierkegaard shares with Wittgenstein the interest in a way of
working which stresses the transitions rather than the theses.
His interest in the polemical and corrective is a good indication
of this. But it is easy to forget the stress on transitions when
confronted with a 'system' like that of the 'stages on life's
way.' Kierkegaard takes care to delineate the operators of the
transitions between the stages. The transition between the
aesthetic and the ethical is marked by irony, and the transition
from the ethical to the religious by humor. [43]
Both humor and irony depend on the clash of perspectives. To
see a situation as humorous depends on the ability to step out of
it, to see it as another might. The inclosing seriousness of a
perspective is shattered. Then there is the possibility that a
new perspective can be gained.
Kierkegaard places considerable stress on these transitional
categories, although in view of the fact that his dissertation
was about the concept of irony in both ancient and modern times,
this is not surprising. Wittgenstein has much less to say about
them in a theoretical vein. He does comment that the 'depth' of
grammatical jokes is like that of philosophy.50 And
Malcolm notes that Wittgenstein had once claimed that it would be
possible to write a serious philosophical work consisting solely
of jokes.51 But the principle
evidence of his understanding of the importance of these
phenomena in changing one's way of looking at the world lies in
the (often heavy-
The importance of disturbing presuppositions is also
expressed in Wittgenstein's desire to transform 'disguised
nonsense' into 'patent nonsense.'53 Once nonsense is
recognized as such, it will be much easier to reject. Humor and
irony are excellent methods of beginning this recognition.
The feature of language which Wittgenstein thinks susceptible
to these clarifying techniques is what he calls its 'grammar.'
The kind of reminders he uses are reminders of the way in which
the language is used every day; 'philosophical problems arise
when language goes on holiday.'54 One basic type of
misunderstanding is that which arises when the surface appearance
of a linguistic structure is different from its actual usage - a
conflict between the 'surface grammar' and the 'deep
grammar.'55 For instance one
might be tempted to group 'games' together just because they all
are given that name; Wittgenstein reminds us of the variety of
phenomena that lurk beneath the common name.56
Wittgenstein's dependance on 'everyday language' is subtle.
He is interested in what he or others may be 'inclined to say.'
But such an inclination or temptation is merely raw material; the
surface inclination may mask a deeper confusion, and this is the
province of philosophical 'treatment.'57 [44]
Kierkegaard's psychological investigations perform a similar
function. He is recalling people from flights of systematic or
religious fancy by recalling the forgotten circumstances of
everyday life. Although Christianity might seem to be just
another possible lifestyle, Kierkegaard reminds his audience that
it is 'deeply' different. It is different because it claims to
address the central existential question of finitude.
The mention of 'intermediate links' in the quotation
on p. 42
deserves further examination. Such links are an important
feature of both Kierkegaard's and Wittgenstein's work. In both
cases the links proposed often take the form of stories or
invented situations. Two cases are shown to be similar in that
they share features with a third case. Here one might recall
Wittgenstein's concept of 'family resemblance.' But it is not as
though these links have any real life of their own. It is the
formal connection between existing cases that is interesting; the
link calls attention to the similarity, and at the same time
(like 'family resemblance') emphasizes the differences. The
links and parables are attempts to call attention to the way of
seeing being put forward.58
Important reflections of this technique occur in two of the
central discussions of the Investigations: that of 'now I
understand, now I can go on' and that of the phenomena of
'seeing' and 'seeing-
The material concerning 'now I understand' begins at section
143 of the Investigations. One part of the point of this
discussion is an elucidation of the grammar of 'to know' and
allied concepts. The surface grammar makes us think that
'knowing' or 'being able' is a particular thing or experience
that accompanies the performance of correctly continuing a
required series. In fact (on closer observation) it is not even
the case that some particular content is connected with this
performance. An interesting example is the sudden grasping of a
crossword answer. The feeling of ability to write the correct
word often comes before the word itself; the pen starts moving
toward the paper before the word comes to mind explicitly.59
Being able to continue is often the result of 'having a
technique,' which of course does not indicate any continuous
state of conscious mind. [45]
The point of this discussion as it affects the present
argument is that there is not necessarily any additional content
which suddenly makes understanding or continuing a series
possible. In making the correct arrangement of a jigsaw puzzle,
the 'scheme' of the puzzle does not necessarily enter in; rather,
the arrangement simply is made. Reasons for choosing a
particular answer to a crossword need not be explicit or new
information. The usual way in which we solve problems is a good
model of the use of the idea of 'perspicuous presentation,' which
works for Wittgenstein both in everyday life and in philosophy.
Kierkegaard's idea of the 'perspective of faith' fits well
with this model of problem-
The discussion of the grammar of the word 'see' occupies most
of section xi, the longest section of part two of the
Investigations. Intertwined in normal usage are the
photographic 'seeing' which would permit a copy to be made, and
the gestalten 'seeing' (or fossilized 'seeing-
The phenomenon of aspects may recur on many different levels.
The most basic is that of applications of a picture. As
Wittgenstein points out, the same two-
Another level of aspects of situations and presentations is
their state of fluidity or solidity. Optical illusions are
purposely constructed with a lack of contextual cues, so that the
interpretation remains fluid. But we tend to see only one aspect
of everyday objects. One everyday object which may serve as an
example is a mirror. We do not 'take it as' a mirror (as we may
'take' the two-
Philosophical problems have many features in common with the
case of the mirror. They are traditionally seen in a certain
way. But the way in which they are seen may not be appropriate;
it may be problematic. Then the problem of the philosopher is
first to re-fluidize the understanding of the problem, and then
to change the way in which it is understood. This must be done
indirectly. A fork might well be used as a garden tool, but one
cannot simply claim that an heirloom silver fork is a garden
tool; one must be convincing. This is partially because there is
no separate 'knowing' which can be adduced to prove the
possibility of this use; there is no additional information to be
given. But certain aspects of the situation must be emphasized -
perhaps the urgent need for shipwreck survivors to plant seeds
for food on a desert island.
Kierkegaard's objective with regard to the concept
'Christian' is of a similar kind. The understanding of the word
has become canalized in a bad direction. Through his polemic, he
hopes to recall the Gospel grammar of the concept.61
Both Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard were interested in the
rejection of pat answers. The 'task' of Johannes Climacus,
quoted above, will serve as a convenient representation of
Kierkegaard's thoughts on this matter. Those who were 'making
things easier' in philosophy and religion in his time were the
Hegelian systematists. And Wittgenstein had the same concern
about the professional philosophers. They promised complete
understanding, a 'crystalline system.' But the twofold problem
with this idea is that the idea is flawed and (partly as a
result) 'philosophy' cannot deliver as advertised. The
Investigations are messier in appearance than the
Tractatus; things are made more difficult; but not more
difficult than they really are. The solution, while of a
different kind than that proposed by a system, is no less final
once grasped.
[47]
The ideal of the task of convincing brings up another important
point of contact between the methodologies of Kierkegaard and
Wittgenstein. They both focussed their efforts on the
individual. This focus can be clearly seen in the prefaces to
Wittgenstein's works. That of the Investigations says: 'I
should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of
thinking. But, if possible, to stimulate someone to thoughts of
his own.'62 And the first
paragraph of the preface to the Tractatus reads:
Perhaps this book will be understood only by someone who
has himself already had the thoughts that are expressed in it
- or at least similar thoughts. - so it is not a textbook. -
Its purpose would be achieved if it gave pleasure to one
person who read and understood it.63
These formulations clearly recall the emphasis which Kierkegaard
places on the individual reader. There are good reasons why they
should. First, both authors are communicating indirectly. As
was suggested above, the nature of that enterprise is such that
every individual reader must be independently convinced of the
proposed improvements in understanding. A directly communicated
work - a scientific text - can be relied upon. The material in
it is factual, and has been derived according to various laws and
standards. As Wittgenstein says, the content of 'theses' must be
acceded to by all. But a perspicuous presentation of the facts,
designed to alter someone's view of the world, can only be
accepted or rejected by each individual.
Kierkegaard's understanding of this method is demonstrated
when he talks of 'appropriation' and 'double reflection.' These
two categories stress the role of the person on the receiving
end. Indirect communication is doubly reflected. The
communicator reflects on the problem, and makes an attempt at
communication. The listener must also reflect, and his
reflection governs the way in which he will appropriate the
material. The dialectic of double reflection is explained in his
material on 'the listener's role in a devotional address' in
Purity of Heart.64 It is also shown - in
fact, perhaps best shown - by the development of his own case.
He remarks in a journal entry:
It must above all be pointed out that I am not a teacher
who originally envisioned everything and now,
self-
This passage provides a link between 'indirect communication'
and the category of 'the individual,' which is also closely
related to 'the problem,' Kierkegaard's task. It must not be
forgotten that his uses of this category is limited and
polemical.
Gregor Malantschuk provides an interesting analysis of four
terms which Kierkegaard uses for individual humans. The lowest
term is Exemplar, indicating a specimen, copy, or member
of a crowd. Next stands the individual (Individ), who is
not simply a member of the species or herd in an animal sense,
but nevertheless remains dependent on his heredity and
environment. Third is Individualitet, conscious
self-
Although Kierkegaard's dedications are to Hiin Enkelte
(originally meant to refer to Regine), in the context of his own
understanding of his 'task' this term has a double meaning. Many
of the pseudonymous works effect their results through pictures
of extraordinary individuals, or archetypes. In the Edifying
Discourses, rather than the person of position it indicates
the potential within everyman. The thrumming of this dialectical
tension will at least serve, like a noisemaker, to call attention
to the importance of the category.67 But even when
Kierkegaard is talking about 'everyman,' this is not to
say the 'crowd'; the mentality of the crowd, which easily does
things that no individual would do, is 'untruth.'68 The
authorship is directed to each and not to all: to Hiin
Enkelte and not to the Exemplar.
The importance of the term for Kierkegaard's 'task' is
related to the illusion he sought to destroy, that 'all are
Christians of a sort.' The category 'individual' is the 'narrow
defile' through which any Christian must pass. It is essential
for those who would become Christian, and so getting the category
noticed must be one of Kierkegaard's highest priorities.69
The 'Socratic' nature of the enterprise being carried out by
each [49] author reflects another facet of
the dedication
to the individual. Quite aside from the idea of 'Socratic
method,' or asking leading questions (which is practiced by
both), there is a similarity between the way in which they
generated their thoughts and the way in which Socrates worked.
Kierkegaard comments in his dissertation that the Academy
essentially consisted in a group of people sitting around
watching Socrates think.70 It is hard to imagine
a more apt description of Wittgenstein's classes. His published
works all follow the same pattern. Even the Tractatus,
which was polished so far beyond the notebook form, is merely a
compilation of 'that which really occurred to me - and how it
occurred to me.'71 The
Investigations and some of the other works were polished
to some extent, but they retain the form of internal dialogue and
attempts at convincing oneself.
Kierkegaard's works, of course, also follow the same pattern.
Through the intervention of 'Divine Governance,' the working out
of his personal thoughts and difficulties was projected into the
task of explicating 'becoming a Christian.'
Kierkegaard's understanding of the idea of Governance is an
ironical one. It involves his looking back over his life and
noting the plan. Like Socrates, he found 'world-
All this is of course not to deny that the works of
Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein have a larger relevance. In fact,
this relevance is stressed by both. Much of it
is derived from the personal relevance which the works
had first. The authors felt that the works could only acquire
any possible larger relevance piecemeal, by becoming relevant for
individuals.
This is one of the roots of a final Kierkegaardian category,
'without authority.' Kierkegaard defines authority as 'a
specific quality which, coming from elsewhere, becomes
qualitatively apparent when the content of the message or of the
action is posited as indifferent.'72 As has been mentioned
in chapter 1, Kierkegaard did not claim any authority for his
work. His was a peculiarly dialectical position. He was without
temporal authority (because not ordained) and without eternal
authority (because not a prophet or an apostle). Nevertheless he
found his 'genius' - his natural talent - to be 'daimonically'
guided by 'Divine Governance.' His whole life was willy-
In the foregoing material some features of a method have been
presented. They center around various common themes: the place
of philosophy, the polemical task, the address to the individual,
the stress on transitions, the necessary use of indirect forms of
communication, the recognition of the phenomenon of perspective,
the refusal of didactic authority. Some of these categories are
more clearly articulated by Wittgenstein; some are better
expressed by Kierkegaard. Both thinkers can be understood in
these terms. Each did actually understand his own work in these
terms to some extent.
But the limits of the method which these features delineate
cannot be exactly specified. One more category may be useful in
explaining this vagueness.
A feature of phenomena that impressed Wittgenstein was their
almost infinite suggestiveness. He discussed this
category explicitly in connection with two great interpreters of
the human experience, Frazer and Freud. He was critical of both
thinkers, and for a similar reason: they were reluctant to allow
the possibility of diverse interpretations of phenomena. Freud's
insistence on the one correct interpretation of dreams and
jokes was discussed in various lectures and conversations.73
Frazer's tendency to see magic as 'wrong science' and to claim
that our interpretations of traditions depend on their historical
development received similarly short shrift.74
This reluctance to agree to the existence of single correct
and causally based interpretations is reflected in the nature of
Wittgenstein's own work - and in Kierkegaard's. What is being
put forward is not one particular point of view, but many
suggestions that tend toward a kind of viewpoint. (Not one face,
but a Galtonian composite.) Only the reader can connect the
given examples into a way of thinking and life. Wittgenstein
remarks that he is attempting to change the 'style of thinking'
(or to persuade others to change their style of thinking).75
The style of the two authors' works clearly reflects their
'style of thinking.' The same problem is often approached from a
variety of viewpoints. Quite ordinary phenomena become
extraordinary when seen in the appropriate contexts. But the
immediate context of a remark is not always its only fruitful
context. This is certainly true of the 'Diary of the Seducer,'
for example. And it is also true of Wittgenstein's remarks. His
struggles over their arrangement often [51]
resulted in
the inclusion of the same remark in more than one manuscript.
Nor is it merely a question of weakness or indecisiveness; the
remarks actually contribute to a variety of discussions. The
decimal numbering of the Tractatus is an invitation to
read the remarks in a variety of sequences, or to a variety of
depths. At one time Wittgenstein actually thought of connecting
the remarks in the Investigations with a 'network' of
numbers.76 In short, both
authors' works are 'hypertexts' which guide the reader, but
require an active construction at the time of reading.77
But this shared understanding of the way in which ideas could
be communicated has led to problems in the understanding of the
upshot of their works. Kierkegaard has been called an
irrationalist and a fideist, and said to promote a purely
subjective ideal incompatible with social institutions like the
established church. Wittgenstein has been called a fideist and a
relativist, and seen to promote a purely social ideal in
reaction to the traditional concept of the subject. The next
chapter will attempt to sort out some of these assertions, and to
give some idea of the kind of position that one might come to by
aid of their methods.
Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity.
A philosophical work consists essentially of
elucidations.
Philosophy does not result in 'philosophical
propositions,' but rather in the clarification of
propositions.
Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and
indistinct: its task is to make them clear and give them
sharp boundaries.
It must set limits to what cannot be thought by working
outwards through what can be thought.